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The use of external consultants in government in the management and policy realms has 
drawn increasing attention in many countries in recent years, including Canada. Studies 
were undertaken internationally in the 1990s and 2000s as legislatures and their 
accounting arms became concerned with the ‘hidden’ costs of the ‘corporatization’ of the 
public service and tried to expand benchmarking measures for government efficiency to 
include external consultants. Accounting for these increases in expenditure on 
consultancy however, continues to face several critical challenges given the current state 
of governmental financial and personnel reporting. In all cases the data on which 
existing reports have heretofore been drawn is very weak. We examine results from a new 
dataset compiled from Proactive Disclosure data in order to help clarify the situation of 
management consulting in Canada at the Departmental level. 
 
Introduction 
The use of external consultants in government is an increasingly important focus 
of concern (ANAO 2001; House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (UK) 2010; 
Auditor General of Canada 2012a; 2012b). Two correlated questions sit at the crux of this 
concern: how to control costs and how to assess the effect of consultants on government 
activities. This is true of the use of consultants generally and, more specifically, of their 
use in a management and policy capacity. Because of the limits of current data that is 
available from government sources our main focus will be management consulting but, 
where possible, we shall also discuss the policy area. The paper focuses on the demand 
for consulting services in these areas, comparing the activity of federal departments and 
agencies. In particular we map the progression of management consulting contracts 
across the federal administration and identify the largest administrative users of these 
categories of consulting services. The research in this article is limited to the federal 
government as the financial records for the various Provinces and Territories lag far 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2248401
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behind those of the federal government in this area and do not offer sufficient detail in 
their reporting to provide solid analytical data comparable to that presented here. 
There are definitional differences between policy consultants and management 
consultants in general and for those records kept by the Federal Government and the 
private sector. The Federal Government Treasury Board expenditure category 0491 
(―Management Consulting‖) used in this article is defined as containing ―consulting 
services for financial management, transportation, economic development, environmental 
planning, public consultation and other consulting services not specifically mentioned in 
other objects.‖ These ‗other objects‘ consist of a variety of codes related to various other 
kinds of professional and technical services. The private sector, on the other hand, uses 
the North American Industry Classifications System (NAICS) definition used by 
Statistics Canada and other NAFTA statistical agencies, which focuses on the provision 
of ―advice and assistance to businesses and other organizations on management issues, 
such as strategic and organizational planning; financial planning and budgeting; 
marketing objectives and policies; human resource policies, practices, and planning; 
production scheduling; and control planning.‖ That is, the NAICS definition focuses on 
business services while the Treasury Board category includes a variety of tasks related to 
government policy-making activities. Consulting on policy matters, as opposed to 
management or organizational issues, is thus a sub-sector of the Treasury Board 
management consulting category that Perl and White (2002: 51), for example, defined as 
involving ―the engagement of external analytical capacity by state actors to perform all or 
part of the strategic, research, assessment or evaluative tasks that comprise the functions 
of policy analysis.‖  
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The explanations of the emergence of policy and management consulting 
practices in government and the reasons at its root are varied. Some accounts place 
consulting within the larger framework of increased contracting out and part-time service 
delivery in government and see it as part of a more general shift in the overall nature of 
state-societal relations – away from the ‗positive‘ or ‗regulatory‘ state (Majone 1997) and 
towards the ‗service‘, ‗franchise‘, or ‗competition‘ state (Butcher et al 2009; Perl and 
White 2002; Radcliffe 2010; Bilodeau, Laurin, and Vining 2007). An approach that is 
shared by the more historically inclined analysis of Saint-Martin (1998b; 2005; 2006) who 
suggested that rising ‗consultocracy‘ led to a weakening of democratic practices and 
public direction of policy and administrative developments. 
Notions of the rise of the franchise state for example, are centered on the idea that 
the contemporary ‗service state‘ is based on many more external-internal links in the 
provisions of services – in which contracting is the norm in many areas – than the pre 
WWII ‗autarkic state‘ which was based on ―in house provision of all kinds of services‖. 
The primary aim of in-house provision was usually to provide ‗consistency, reliability 
and standardization‘ in service provision (Butcher et al 2010 p. 22) concerns which have 
been replaced, it is argued, by ―a hybrid mixture of part public, part private, activities, 
delivery that does not remain in neat boxes or organizational settings, (with) loose 
combination of actors and providers who are each necessary to see something delivered‖ 
(Butcher et al 2010 p. 31). Here the state is seen as the chief contractor and variety in the 
nature of goods and services provided and their provision is seen as neither surprising nor 
unexpected.  
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Some scholars have noted that the use of for-hire consultants has extended far 
beyond public service provision to now play an increasing role in policy-making and 
organizational management activities within government, arguably an increasingly 
influential one (Guttman and Willner 1976; Kipping and Engwall 2003; Martin 1998). 
Others, however, see the use of consultants in policy-making as a less significant activity 
linked to the normal development of policy advice systems in modern government as 
business groups and others require specialized expertise in their efforts to lobby 
governments, and government agencies in turn require similar expertise in order to deal 
with ever more active business, NGOs, and other participants in policy-making processes 
(Halligan 1995; Lahusen 2002).  As Lahusen put it: 
Consultancies are at the head of a growing professionalization and 
institutionalization of interest intermediation: first, these companies 
are able to establish themselves successfully beside trade associations; 
second they are able to expand in terms of staff and national branches; 
third they successfully provide professional skills and services above 
and beyond the specific interests or issues to be dealt with, i.e. they 
possess ‗neutral‘ professional tools to be learned and applied by new 
managerial staff. (2002 p. 697) 
 
Czarniawska and Mazza (2003) also suggest that consultants are likely to play a limited 
role in policy-making, arguing they are poorly organized to exercise any kind of 
permanent policy influence and rely very much on the existence of a variety of 
appropriate political and institutional characteristics – such as the rise of the service state 
– in order to exercise any influence at all. This is a view, which has been supported by the 
findings of van Houten and Goldman (1981) and, to a lesser extent, Saint Martin (1998a 
and 1998b).  
Such dichotomous views cry out for more nuanced analyses (Clark and Fincham 
2002) which not only can more accurately assess basic quantitative questions such as how 
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many consultants and contracts there are, and if their numbers grew over the past several 
decades, but can also carefully examine the qualitative questions around the nature of 
influence in governments and the role consultants play in it, from the provision of direct 
advice to the more indirect creation of specific kinds of knowledge and its 
mobilization/utilization in policy deliberations (van Helden et al 2010; Weiss 1977; 1986).  
Analyses to date, however, have looked mainly at the financial impact of 
contracts rather than at their effects, such as their impact on officials abrogating 
responsibility for policy decision or otherwise affecting the policy capacity of 
departments and agencies involved in their hire (Bakvis, 1997; Saint-Martin 2005; Speers, 
2007; Howlett and Newman 2010). There are few studies of the long-term staffing and 




 Until recently it was the case that data problems, especially but not solely in the 
area of policy consulting, were acute and prevented serious evaluation of these issues. 
There are long-standing problems in separating consultants hired to perform more rank-
and-file jobs such as information technology consulting, or management consulting 
broadly writ, and those classifiable as policy advisors or policy consultants, for example. 
Other problems concerned existing data collection techniques in government, which 
either did not cover relatively small contracts or blended policy-related work together 
with other activities such as ‗professional services‘ or ‗temporary work.‘ What‘s more, 
often decisions about these reporting matters were left up to individual units, meaning 
whatever data existed was often idiosyncratic and difficult to compare across units, 
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meaning it has been very difficult to arrive at an accurate assessment of the scope and use 
of any kind of consultants, including management and policy ones, across government. 
Recently, however, both regulatory and institutional steps have been taken in 
Canada to deal with some of these issues, although often unintentionally and linked to 
government efforts at further cost efficiency or to contracting scandals and their 
aftermath.
2
 Access to data about federal government contract expenditures, for example, 
has recently been improved due to two developments linked to the 2004 scandal 
surrounding Quebec advertising contracts and the Liberal Party (―Sponsorgate‖) (Gomery 
2005; 2006). First, on March 23, 2004 the Federal government introduced rules of 
proactive disclosure so that, beginning in October 2004, all contracts above $10,000.00 
are published on government websites. This increased the number of contracts reported in 
detail, lowering the old limit of $100,000. Another tool is the Federal Accountability Act, 
which came into effect on December 12, 2006. The Act has legislative, procedural and 
institutional facets designed to increase the transparency and accountability of all 
government spending including contracting and, along with the new framework for 
procurement accounting procedures and the requirement to table an annual report, it was 
intended to improve transparency. The Act also created the Office of the Procurement 
Ombudsman, which is tasked with addressing perceived business fairness and 
competitiveness issues in the procurement area and reports regularly on policies and 
practices in this area. In 2003, the federal government also developed a Management 
Accountability Framework (MAF) laying out the Treasury Board‘s expectations of 
management best practices across all areas of government including contracting. 
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The new data and enhanced clarity are useful to researchers inquiring into 
government contracting including policy-related consulting. Problems still exist in 
separating out purely policy-related from purely management related activities and at 
least one major federal actor, National Defence, does not use the 0491 reporting category 
utilized here. Nevertheless in what follows we are able to present the results of an 
analysis of this new data which allows us to determine much more precisely than ever 
before not just the aggregate level of spending and activity on policy and management 
consulting on the part of the federal government, but also its precise focus and 
concentration in specific departments. 
The Field in Canada Until Now: Data Limitations and Findings  
The General Picture 
Beyond a smattering of early pieces on the subject of contracting from the 1960s and 
1970s (see Deutsch 1973; Meredith and Martin 1970), studies of policy and management 
consultants‘ roles in Canada can be divided temporally into an initial set of primarily 
empirical works written at the end of the 1990s and more conceptual discussions about 
policy advisors and their impact after 2000. The former tended to rely on anecdotal 
analysis and required the authors to mine relatively unspecified and un-detailed public 
accounts for numbers on the cost and pervasiveness of policy consultants at both the 
federal and provincial level (Bakvis 1997; Saint-Martin 1998a, 1998b). The more recent 
crop of research explores the role of policy analysts and advisors at the provincial and 
federal levels using surveys and other data but deals with policy consulting only in 
passing (Perl and White 2002; Howlett and Newman 2010; Howlett 2009; Prince 2007; 




 Perl and White (2002: 52) in their path-breaking 2002 study found the ―evidence 
for a growing role played by policy consultants at the national government level is 
compelling in Canada‖ noting that annual, government-wide, expenditure on ―other 
professional services‖ reported in the Public Accounts of Canada for fiscal years 1981-82 
through 2000-01 showed ―a continuous increase from C$239 million in 1981-82 to 
C$1.55 billion in 2000-01 (a 647% increase). As a share of total government expenditures 
this meant almost tripling Ottawa‘s budgetary allocations (Perl and White 2002: 53). 
 Perl and White, however, also noted the poor nature of the data with which they 
had to work, and the difficulties this generated for the analysis of policy consulting. 
Because of its aggregate nature it tended to combine together all kinds of professional 
services, for example, in the information technology, geology or environmental areas, 
which have little direct impact of public policy decision-making. This allowed for an 
exploration of the management side of the issue but severely limited the study of the 
policy side. 
Similar problems were highlighted recently by the Public Service of Canada 
(2010) in a study of temporary help services use – including most consultants – in eleven 
Canadian public service organizations. That study provided some summary information 
on temporary help services contracts concluding they were often used ―improperly‖ to 
address long-term resourcing needs. Two practices were found to be especially 
significant in the long-term reliance of many departments upon temporary help services. 
The first was the use of full-time ―temporary help‖ service contracts. The second was the 
―use of individual temporary help service workers in a continuous working relationship 
with the contracting organization, either by offering workers a series of temporary help 
 10 
service contracts or by using combinations of contracts and non-permanent appointments 
that fall under the PSEA, such as a term, casual or student appointments‖ (Public Service 
Commission 2010: 4).  
 Nearly one in five of the contracts reviewed (18.4%) exceeded 52 weeks, the 
longest being 165 weeks. Significantly, for our purposes, long-term contracts were more 
common for professional and technical workers than for administrative workers. Also 
significant in terms of a continuous working relationship, 16.3% of temporary help 
workers in these organizations were appointed to a public service position by the same 
organization in which they held their contracts within the two-week period prior to and/or 
subsequent to their contract (Public Service Commission 2010: 4).  
 Overall, the study found the growth of personnel contracts to be rapid and 
increasing in recent years (Public Service Commission 2010: 5), and identified four 
common rationales provided by employers for this growth: increased workload (50.8%); 
coverage during staff activities (21.1%); staff shortages (10.5%); and covering for 
employee leaves (9.8%) with the rest (7.8%) being other areas (Public Service 
Commission 2010: 23).  
 The study concluded that: 
―long-term resourcing needs should be addressed through staffing 
mechanisms pursuant to the PSEA. In our opinion, the study reveals 
an additional workforce within the public service — one that is not 
subject to the PSEA, and that is used for long-term and continuous 
work‖ (Public Service Commission 2010: 3) 
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Management and Policy Consulting 
While highlighting the permanence of many temporary employment relationships, 
the PSC study did not specifically focus upon management or policy consultants. 
MacDonald (2011), however, included management consultants in his recent study of 
federal outsourcing. Although he also encountered serious data limits he too argued that 
in this area a trend to increased contracting was intensifying as federal government 
departments initiated measures to ―cut expenditures in an age of austerity‖ (MacDonald 
2011: 5).  He found the cost of federal personnel outsourcing of temporary help, IT 
consultants and management consultants since 2005-2006 to have ballooned by almost 
80%, to nearly $5.5 billion over the period.  
Macdonald found the growth in personnel outsourcing to be concentrated in four 
large departments — Public Works and Government Services Canada, National Defence 
and Canadian Forces, Human Resources and Skills Development, and Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness — which together made up half of all federal government 
outsourcing. Their payrolls increased by only 9% since 2005–06, but their personnel 
outsourcing costs rose by 100% (MacDonald 2011: 5). However he did not break out 
expenditures related to management and policy consulting. We are able to do this now 
given the improved data alluded to above. 
 
Assessing the Demand Side for Consultants: New Data From Canada Post 2004 
 Three major datasets are now available for research in the Canadian system of 
contracting and their merits and demerits are well summarized by MacDonald (2011: 22-
23). They include the MERX database, the Public Accounts of Canada, and the new 
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Proactive Disclosure. We chose to use the latter because it provides the finest level of 
disaggregation containing all contracts above $10,000.00.  
 We collected from the Proactive Disclosure websites the amounts year over year 
for the period between 2003-2004 and 2013-2014 in this category. The last full set of 
contract data available at the time of writing is 2011/2012, so data past this fiscal year 
only contains adjusted figures for multiple year contracts that extend into the future. 
Furthermore, a new definition of the 0491 category was introduced in 2006 and is 
consistent only since 2006/2007. Some administrative units provide data for previous 
years under the 0491 category but it is unclear (and unlikely) that these were reconciled 
with the new definition. Hence truly comparable data span only the period between 
2006/2007 and 2011/2012.   
 Table 1 provides the trend for the total amounts in the 0491 category for the 
period 2003-2014. Multi-year contracts were distributed annually according to the 
number of months the contract covered.
4
 Figure 1 patterns the growth in the category 
over the period showing rapid growth through to 2009-2010 followed by a decline. 
However, reporting issues explain a large part of the decline that begins with the 2010-
2011 fiscal year as all of the data for the period after 2011-2012 solely reflect multi-years 
contracts extended into the future. Hence, in the key 2006-2011 period the data shows 
only a modest a decline since 2010-2011, still enough to negate some of the concerns 
mentioned in earlier works about the ‗explosive‘ growth of this form of activity. 
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Figure 1 - Management Consulting Total Expenditures in the Federal Government 
of Canada 2003-2014 in Canadian Dollars 
 
Source: Proactive Disclosure (various websites).  





As percentage of whole 
period 2003/4 to 2013/14 
Year over Year change 
2005-2006 $247,259,885.22 8.09% 26.71% 
2006-2007 $261,054,176.68 8.54% 5.58% 
2007-2008 $347,094,921.94 11.36% 32.96% 
2008-2009 $414,364,314.65 13.56% 19.38% 
2009-2010 $448,848,332.83 14.69% 8.32% 
2010-2011 $428,023,992.24 14.00% -4.64% 
2011-2012 $359,413,275.71 11.76% -16.03% 














 Tables 2 and 3 and Figure 2 break these figures down by contracting agency and 
show, again against some expectations and earlier findings and suppositions,  that this 
growth was not government-wide but rather emerged in a relatively small number of 
federal Departments.
5
 The top 16 administrative units of the over 70 for which data is 
available account for over 80 percent of yearly expenditures in this area. 
 
Table 2 - Top 16 Federal Administrative Units by Expenditures in Category 0491 – 
Million Dollars 
  2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012 Total 













               
Agri-Food  $12.39 $10.45 $6.73 $5.76 $5.54 $4.80 $45.69 
CRA $4.95 $3.03 $3.48 $3.60 $3.00 $1.80 $19.89 
Environment Canada $13.65 $17.93 $16.69 $22.46 $24.88 $15.93  $110.71 
F&O $8.10 $8.74 $10.12 $12.42 $13.65 $8.20 $61.24 
DFAIT $1.65 $3.95 $8.47 $12.74 $16.74 $9.88 $53.45 
DND $0.99  $2.18 $6.83 $34.68 $40.87 $39.85 $125.43 
Health  $12.30 $16.36 $15.64 $15.31 $12.58 $16.88 $89.08 
HRSDC $32.23 $61.29 $61.70 $62.20 $57.14 $53.65 $328.22 
INAC $15.87 $11.38 $14.50 $32.18 $31.70 $13.56 $119.20 
Industry Canada $12.15 $11.96 $17.53 $11.68 $13.14 $11.49 $77.97 
NRC  $4.74 $5.83 $5.97 $5.54 $3.84 $4.39 $30.33 
Natural Resources  $5.55 $7.50 $5.82 $3.82 $7.48 $2.76 $32.94 
PWGSC $66.55 $108.50 $147.55 $136.89 $109.96 $113.48 $682.95 
Service Canada $9.54 $7.63 $13.47 $25.90 $24.83 $16.53 $97.90 
Transport Canada $12.84 $17.66 $26.52 $15.20 $15.62 $10.25 $98.15 
TBS $10.69 $6.38 $3.31 $4.01 $4.84 $5.95 $35.29 
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Source: Proactive Disclosure (various websites). Please note that PWGSC, HRSDC, Service Canada’s and DND’s 
totals are affected by very large contracts ($407M, $270M, $67M and $108M respectively).  
 
 Table 3 - Top 16 Federal Administrative Units by Expenditures in Category 
0491 – Percentage of Total 
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Department        
Agri-Food  4.75% 3.01% 1.62% 1.28% 1.30% 1.34% 2.22% 
CRA 1.90% 0.88% 0.84% 0.80% 0.70% 0.50% 0.94% 
Environment 
Canada 
5.23% 5.17% 4.03% 5.00% 5.81% 4.20% 4.91% 
F&O 3.11% 2.52% 2.44% 2.77% 3.19% 2.28% 2.72% 
DFAIT 0.63% 1.14% 2.04% 2.84% 3.91% 2.75% 2.22% 
DND 0.38% 0.63% 1.65% 7.73% 9.55% 11.09% 5.17% 
Health Canada 4.71% 4.71% 3.78% 3.41% 2.94% 4.71% 4.04% 
HRSDC 12.35% 17.66% 14.89% 13.86% 13.35% 12.35% 14.51% 
INAC 6.08% 3.28% 3.50% 7.17% 7.41% 6.08% 5.20% 
Industry Canada 4.65% 3.45% 4.23% 2.60% 3.07% 4.65% 3.53% 
NRC 1.82% 1.68% 1.44% 1.24% 0.90% 1.82% 1.38% 
Natural Resources  2.13% 2.16% 1.40% 0.85% 1.75% 2.13% 1.51% 
PWGSC 25.49% 31.26% 35.61% 30.50% 25.69% 25.49% 30.02% 
Service Canada 3.66% 2.20% 3.25% 5.77% 5.80% 3.66% 4.21% 
Transport Canada 4.92% 5.09% 6.41% 3.39% 3.65% 4.92% 4.39% 
TBS 4.10% 1.84% 0.80% 0.91% 1.13% 4.10% 1.74% 
         




As Figure 2 shows, while expenditures in general grew rapidly in this area, the high 
percentage of contracts let by these units also remained consistent over the entire period 
examined and accounts for a very high proportion of multi-year forwarded contracts. 
 
Figure 2 - Expenditures in Management Consulting. Total and Top 16 Federal 
Administrative Units 
 
Source: Proactive Disclosure (various websites).  
 
In fact, the concentration is much higher than even these figures reveal. That is, only two 
Departments Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) and Human 
Resources and Skills Development Canada (HRSDC) account for about half of all 
management consulting contract expenditures. Despite using a different classifications 












Total for Canada Subtotal for Group
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(although spending in this area here became significant only with the 2009/2010 fiscal 
year) and Service Canada and Environment Canada followed with about five percent 
each of the total (see Figure 3). These five departments have consistently been dominant 
in this category of expenditures over the entire period, now accounting for roughly 70-
75% of expenditures on management consultants in the entire Federal government.  
 
Figure 3 - Select Management Consulting Spending – Percentage of total 
 
Source: Proactive Disclosure (various websites).  
 
Analysis: Contracting Behaviour of Canadian Federal Government Departments 
Of course, these are the same units highlighted by MacDonald (2010) as the major 
purchasers of all types of contracts and the trends listed here are similar to those found 









2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012
5.23% 5.17% 4.03% 5.00% 5.81% 4.20% 
12.35% 
17.66% 

















Environment Canada HRSDC PWGSC Service Canada National Defense
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Departments and agencies. Another question, which this data can address, is related to the 
size of contracts. That is, whether contracts in the policy and management consulting 
areas also follow the general pattern of government contracting overall, which is to have 
a very small number of large contracts and contracting firms providing the lion‘s share of 
consulting work.  
Closer examination of the data reveals that this is indeed the case as several very 
large outlier contracts awarded by PWGSC, HRSDC, Service Canada and DND account 
for a very large percentage of overall contract expenditures. In fact, four very large multi-
year contracts skew the final amounts considerably. Starting with the 2009/2010 fiscal 
year expenditure for National Defense, for example, a large multi-year contract was 
awarded to Calian Ltd, a major business and technical services company with a history in 
satellite communications, for a total of $108 million, accounting for an adjusted amount 
of over $20 million per year. This, depending on the year, represents between 50% and 
58% of the Department‘s total contracts in this area. For PWGSC a multi-year contract 
beginning in 2006/2007 and averaging an adjusted amount of $57.5 million per year 
accounts was let to IBM Canada. Depending on the year, this accounted for between 40% 
and 55% of total expenditure for the Department. HRSDC awarded Resolve Corporation, 
a major business services company specializing in financial management but also call 
centers and other kinds of activities, a $270M contract spanning the period between the 
third quarter of the 2008/2009 and 2012/2013 fiscal years. The adjusted yearly average of 
$42M represents over two thirds of the Department‘s total expenditure during this period. 
Finally, Service Canada awarded a contract to Quantum Management Systems, a US-
based ―full service management and training‖ company, for an adjusted value for 
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2009/2010 and 2010/2011 of over $22 million representing over 85% of the expenditure 
in this envelope for these years.  
 While these contracts are clearly significant and reinforce the finding that a large 
percentage of contracting activity in this sector originates from a small number of 
departments and involves a very small number of contractors, once these ‗outliers‘ are 
removed, a more nuanced picture emerges where a larger number of units and a larger 
number of small firms and contracts are involved in this activity. 
 
Number and Size of Contracts 
In terms of the number of contracts the various administrative units let over the 
whole period, only 11 units among the 78 administrative units cited showed more than 
1,000 contracts, while 32 have between 100 and 1,000 contracts.
6
 The rest had less than 
100 contracts over the whole period. Distributional patterns are also revealing. The most 
common one shows the overall number of contracts declining from an early peak, usually 
because of a drop in the number of small contracts. Generally, administrative units do not 
show an increase in the total amount of contracts let over the whole period considered. In 
fact, only INAC, Fisheries and Oceans, and the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade follow an upward trend into 2010/2011. 
For the full set of contracts the average contract value over the full period under 
examination was $203,114.54. However both the median and the mode were $25,000.00, 
reflecting the skew occasioned by the largest contracts. Table 4 highlights the Average, 
Median and Mode statistics for each Department/Agency in the Federal government. This 
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is interesting not the least because the modal value is well below the pre-2004 $100K 
accounting cut off and would have escaped notice and detail in pre-2004 reporting. 
 We can isolate four categories of contracts according to the averages of the 
contracts that were let: (1) ―Small‖ contracts with a value lower than $25,000.00, (2) 
―Medium‖ between $25,000.00 and $50,000.00, (3) ―Large‖ between $50.000.00 and 
$100,000.00 and finally a (4) ―Very Large‖ category for contracts averaging above 
$100,000.00. Twelve administrative units belong in the first category, 46 in the second, 
14 in the third, and 5 in the largest. Thus only a relatively small number of agencies on 
average have let very small contracts, while most let contracts with an average value 
between $25,000.00 and $50,000.00.
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Table 4 – Distribution of Average Contract Values among Federal Administrative 
Units   
 Administrative Unit Total 0491 
Contracts 
(Million of $) 
Administrative Unit Total 0491 
Contracts 








Office of the Auditor General of 
Canada 
$4.1 













Office of the Superintendent of 




















National Parole Board $1.5 
 












Industry Canada $112.8 
 
 
Canada Economic Development 




Health Canada $123.6 
















Canadian Artists and Producers $0.19 National Research Council $37.5 
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Department of Justice Canada 
 



















Source: Proactive Disclosure (various websites).  
 
Now consider the distribution of total amounts spent on policy and management 
consulting for administrative units with contract averages between $25,000.00 and 
$50,000.00 and between $50,000.00 and $100,000.00 for the former out of 46 
departments and agencies. Only eight have spent over $20M on these size contracts over 
the period in question with most spending under $20M. Three Departments are clear 
outliers in the sense of focusing much of their activity on small contracts: Environment 
Canada (expenditures of $136.6M over 3,488 contracts), Industry Canada (expenditures 
of $108.7M over 2,827 contracts), and Health Canada (expenditures of $115.5M over 
2,793 contracts), while INAC (expenditures of $120.5M over 1,660 contracts) and 
Transport Canada (expenditures of $110.9M over 1,523 contracts) were the largest users 
of medium-sized contracts. The distribution pattern for the top units in terms of spending 




Table 5. Distribution of Contracts in top Units by Spending - 2003/04 – 2013/14 




National Defense 124 (28.18%) 83 (18.86%) 100 (22.73%) 133 (30.23%) 
HRSDC 1,461 (63.30%) 375 (16.25%) 270 (11.70%) 202 (10.33%) 
Service Canada 314 (51.31%) 111 (18.14%) 95 (15.52%) 92 (15.03%) 
PWGSC 2,819 (43.20%) 1,440 (22.07%) 1,503 (23.03%) 763 (11.69%) 
Environment 
Canada 
3,439 (73.50%) 643 (13.74%) 393 (8.40%) 204 (4.36%) 
All units 29,617 (66.65%) 6,494 (14.61%) 5,346 (12.03%) 2,979 (6.70%) 
All units except top 
five 
21,460 (71.84%) 3,842 (12.86%) 2,985 (9.99%) 1,585 (5.31%) 
Source: Proactive Disclosure (various websites). 
 
Frequency of Repeat Contracts 
To assess how ‗concentrated‘ the contracts are in terms of providers, we 
compared the total amounts in the 0491 category for the entire period (2003/2004 to 
2013/2014) with the amounts billed by companies that have been granted at least two 
contracts.  Table 6 shows this measure for the administrative units that billed more than 
$15M.  
 Overall, the Federal public administration awarded 67.70% of the money over the 
period under consideration to companies with two or more contracts. The Department of 
National Defense and Service Canada awarded most of their contracts to suppliers and 
contractors with multiple contracts. Interestingly, HRSDC, one of the country‘s largest 
contractors is also the Department with the lowest percentage of multiple contracts being 
awarded to the same companies. There does not seem to be an immediate explanation for 
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this pattern. Large contracts also affect these data, for example within PWGSC Bell 
Canada received an amended (i.e. multi-year) contract for the total value of $407 million, 
which accounts for 52% of the total amounts granted as repeat contracts through the 
Department.  
Table 6 - Percentage of Repeat Contract amounts – All contracts (By Largest 
amounts) 





PWGSC $1,074,854,102.68 $800,288,555.35 74.46% 
HRSDC $395,823,017.06 $103,962,362.72 26.26% 
National Defense and the Canadian 
Forces $196,014,854.91 $187,782,006.72 95.80% 
Environment Canada $136,711,454.82 $99,919,457.76 73.09% 
Health Canada $123,641,689.25 $88,164,947.35 71.31% 
INAC $122,909,492.32 $101,856,513.42 82.87% 
Transport Canada $115,313,263.57 $69,419,334.37 60.20% 
Industry Canada $113,175,356.00 $88,833,090.00 78.49% 
Service Canada $104,412,733.96 $97,245,307.42 93.14% 
Fisheries and Oceans Canada $72,616,954.43 $60,366,731.36 83.13% 
DFAIT $57,871,001.14 $27,644,091.25 47.77% 
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada $56,825,456.55 $38,361,015.27 67.51% 
TBS $44,039,542.52 $30,583,755.92 69.45% 
National Research Council Canada $37,734,691.15 $24,534,214.74 65.02% 
Public Health Agency of Canada $37,618,299.00 $21,681,332.11 57.64% 
Natural Resources Canada $37,185,083.56 $20,380,101.92 54.81% 
Canada Revenue Agency $34,668,059.07 $29,384,587.71 84.76% 
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Citizenship and Immigration Canada $29,036,779.07 $19,119,658.57 65.85% 
Public Safety Canada $27,635,540.41 $20,128,934.03 72.84% 
RCMP $15,882,060.59 $6,128,614.76 38.59% 
CIDA $15,558,553.02 $11,782,613.95 75.73% 
Elections Canada $15,389,868.42 $9,271,007.03 60.24% 
Total $2,936,250,596.37 $1,999,651,337.77 66.51% 
Source: Proactive Disclosure (various websites).  
  
The pattern of a general downward trend for larger contracts is more clearly 
evident here. From this brief analysis we can see how, within the scope of the variance 
that we have noted, smaller contracts are declining and very large ones are the only 
category to climb. 
 
Conclusions 
This analysis of the use of policy and management consulting in the Federal 
government based on the new Proactive Disclosure data has highlighted several 
interesting additional dimensions to the general picture of increased contracting and 
temporary services presented in recent studies such as the Public Service Commission 
(2010) and MacDonald (2011). They reveal a picture of a highly skewed process in which 
several Departments dominate the demand for consulting services and the significance of 
large and repeat contracts is clear in this data. Although a significant finding relates to the 
general decline in the number and amounts of large contracts in recent years, it suggests a 
pattern of long-term ongoing interactions between suppliers and purchasers of these 
services – similar to the pattern found by the PSC and one which reinforces in this area of 
 27 
government activity the same pattern of the ―permanence of temporary services‖ found in 
earlier aggregate studies of government contracting and temporary help. 
While it has not been possible to conclude from this data what impact this 
consulting activity has had on policy work in government, this pattern of expenditures is 
consistent with the idea put forward by Speers (2007) and Saint-Martin (2006) that 
consultants indeed comprise a hidden or ‗invisible civil service.‘ That is despite their 
legal status as being temporary and ad hoc in nature, they have a more or less permanent 
and fixed character which largely escapes traditional reporting and accountability 
measures, until very recently, in fact, operating without even the limited transparency 
provisions which allow insights into the world of the visible public service.  
 
Endnotes
                                                        
1
 This attention towards economic benchmarking can be partially explained by the 
fact that most of the supporting arguments for the use of external consultants have 
legitimized it as a mechanism to rationalize or reduce government expenses. 
Governments influenced by New Public Management (NPM) practices in the 1990s and 
early 2000s became very conscious of cost-accounting and increasingly shifted the public 
service away from administering programs to managing them in a new ‗service‘ or 
contract state in which multiple ‗contractees‘ would deliver goods and services on 
government behalf (Freeman 2000; Vincent-Jones 2006; Butcher et al 2009). This move 
towards the ‗corporatization‘ of public services has been argued to have somewhat 
succeeded in improving the classic cost accounting benchmarking measures for 
government efficiency (Bilodeau, Laurin, and Vining 2007) but is of limited use when 
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exploring the effects of this change on patterns of government goods and service 
provision. 
2
 For example to rationalize and streamline the process of government procuring between 
April 2008 and January 2009 Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC), 
consulted on the scope of the "Task and Solutions Based Professional Services" (TSBPS) 
project to generate a better process of data collection on outside goods and services 
contracts. This helped develop a set of shared rules controlling reporting across 
government agencies. However, this was mostly a business-oriented exercise, intended to 
facilitate the relationship between contractors and government. 
 
4
 For example if a contract covered two fiscal years and was awarded for a sum of 
$100,000.00, each year was assigned $50,000.00. Of course this is arbitrary but it allowed 
us to have a more ‗normalized‘ map of this spending.  
5
 National Defense and the Canadian Forces does not use the 0491 code. 
6
 In practice we do not count contract amendments (increased funding extended 
timeframes and so forth) as new contracts, somewhat underestimating the activity. If a 
specific contract was amended twice (for example from a starting value of $10,000.00 to 
$50,000.00 and then to $100,000.00) and it is extended from one to two years, in our 
calculations it would still count as a single contract. 
7
 A similar spread in contract size emerged from an audit of Environment Canada in 
2008-2009 undertaken in response to complaints lodged with the Freedom of Information 
Commissioner alleging favoritism towards a specific firm. The audit examined contracts 
over $25,000 issued by EC and by Public Works and Government Services Canada 
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(PWGSC) on behalf of EC from April 1, 2008, through December 11, 2009 and focused 
on ―Management Consulting and Other Professional Services‖ contracts. This included 
1,337 contracts, for a total value of $27,270,315. 
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